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a b s t r a c t
Network reliability and resilience has become a key design parameter for network
operators and Internet ∧service providers. These often seek ways to have their networksfully operational for at least 99.999% of the time, regardless of the number and ∧type offailures that may occur in their networks.
This article presents a ∧continuous-time Markov chain model to characterise the prop-agation of failures in optical GMPLS rings. Two types of failures are considered depend-
ing on whether they affect only the control plane, or both the control and data planes of
the node. Additionally, it is assumed that control failures propagate along the ring infect-
ing neighbouring nodes, as stated by the Susceptible-Infected-Disabled (SID) propagation
model taken from epidemic-based propagationmodels. A few numerical examples are per-
formed to demonstrate that the CTMC model provides a set of guidelines for selecting the
appropriate repair rates in order to attain specific availability requirements, both in the
control plane and the data plane.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction1
Network reliability and failure resilience has become a2
major concern ∧for Internet service providers and network3 operators. Indeed, network operators often seek ways to4
provide the so-called five-nine reliability level, meaning5
that the objective is to have a fully operational network6
for at least 99.999% of the time. There are several methods7
and techniques for dealing with failures so that service8
continuity is either not compromised in the first place, or9
it is quickly restored [1,2].10
Current networks integrate multiple transport tech-11
nologies so that the whole system follows a stacked mul-12
tilayer architecture, whereby the upper layers operate on13
virtual topologies built successively upon structures pro-14
duced in the lower layers [3]. ∧Generalised Multi-Protocol15
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Label Switching (GMPLS) is gaining wide acceptance as the 16
protocol suite of choice for managing such heterogeneous 17
networks [4]. 18
GMPLS facilitates the interoperation and convergence 19
of disparate transport technologies through a unified con- 20
trol plane, and aims at easing challenging aspects such 21
as service provisioning, traffic engineering and failure re- 22
covery [5]. Despite the fact that a ∧multilayered architec- 23ture can improve network resilience as it brings flexibility 24
to fault management and recovery [6,7], it introduces an 25
undesirable effect known as failure propagation, whereby 26
failures at the bottom layer may disrupt services in higher 27
layers. Besides this, due to the nature of the multilayer 28
architecture, one failure at the bottom layer can manifest 29
itself as several concurrent failures in higher layers. 30
The majority of the approaches to network recovery 31
assume that the number of failureswhose repair is pending 32
at any given time is small (e.g., one or two), and that 33
they occur independently fromone another. The treatment 34
of this type of failure is extensive in the literature, and 35
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all aspects of network design and operation are well1
covered. However, not such extensive research has been2
conducted on scenarios of arbitrary large-scale and/or3
multiple failures. Such failures are usually caused by4
natural disasters or intentional attacks, and thus are much5
rarer than, say, cable cuts or malfunctioning of hardware6
modules, but their consequences are often much severer.7
This paper aims at furthering our understanding of the8
impact on the availability of a GMPLS-based network9
subject to a specific form of multiple failures, namely, the10
one that spreads from one node to its neighbours through11
the control plane, possibly affecting a considerable part of12
the network topology.13
A key feature of GMPLS is the separation of the control14
plane from the data plane, to the point that they can even15
be deployed on separate networks. Due to this separation,16
failures may occur in either of the two planes, or in both17
simultaneously [8]. A failure in the control plane leads18
to the loss of control functionality (e.g., a switch/node19
becomes unmanageable), while a data plane failure affects20
packet-forwarding services [9]. Inmultilayer architectures,21
this separation of planes not only brings many benefits,22
but also a new requirement: the need for resilience in23
the control plane [8,10]. However, to the best of our24
knowledge, no study has been published for a scenario in25
which a control plane failure on anodeultimately provokes26
a failure in the data plane, that is, a situation in where an27
inter-GMPLS plane failure propagation exists.28
The objective of this paper is therefore to characterise29
the transient behaviour and possible states of a GMPLS-30
based optical ring subject to a multiple failure scenario,31
where the propagation of failures occurs simultaneously32
on two axis: horizontally in the control plane, from node33
to node, and vertically from the control plane towards the34
data plane. A ∧continuous-timeMarkov chainmodel is used35 for assessing the reliability of such ring topology.36
The remainder of this work is organised as follows: In37
Section 2, GMPLS-based network failures are explained.38
Section 3, introduces the Susceptible-Infected-Disabled39
(SID) model, which is the basis of the error propagation40
model introduced in Section 4. Then, Section 5 depicts41
some numerical results as an example applied on a eight-42
node ring. Finally, Section 6 concludes this work reviewing43
its main contributions and findings.44
2. Related work and problem statement45
2.1. Failure propagation in multilayer networks46
The negative effects of failure propagation can be47
avoided or limited by having the network’s lower layers48
automatically finding or using new paths or subpaths after49
a failure, provided they have their own protection mecha-50
nisms. Thus, recovery procedures can be automatically ac-51
tivated upon failure transparently to the upper layer [11].52
A different approach is to design the higher-level53
network topology taking into account the capabilities and54
constraints of the network’s lower layers. Thus, when55
designing IP over WDM networks, traffic demands from56
the IP layer are allocated over the WDM infrastructure57
such that, in case of node failure or fibre cut, (a) the58
IP topology is still connected, and (b) there is enough 59
capacity to successfully complete the recovery at the 60
IP layer. This problem is often referred to as network 61
mapping (or survivable mapping) and is known to be 62
NP-complete [11]. Several heuristic algorithms have been 63
proposed in the literature to find such mappings, or to 64
augment the topologies until the appropriate mapping is 65
found, see for instance some relatedworks: [12–14], or the 66
more general studies: [15,3,16–19]. 67
Most of the research in survivable optical networks, 68
including those concerned with multilayer networks, as- 69
sume that failures occur independently from one another. 70
Thus, instances of failures such as fibre cuts and node 71
malfunctioning are usually modelled as isolated and un- 72
related events. Furthermore, as multiple failures are con- 73
sidered possible but rare [20], the focus tends to be on 74
single failures, and on single link failures in particular, with 75
only a few studies tackling the design of networks capa- 76
ble of withstanding up to double link failures. Nonethe- 77
less, one specific form ofmultiple link failure that attracted 78
much attention is that resulting from damages to phys- 79
ical structures, such as ducts, that are shared by other- 80
wise unrelated fibre links. The concept of ‘‘∧Shared Risk 81Link Groups’’ [21,22] and its generalisation ‘‘Shared Risk 82
Resource Groups’’ (SRRG) [23], capture this situation and 83
have been used extensively in network survivability de- 84
sign. However, this study addresses the case of failure 85
propagation across nodes in a networks, which is a very 86
different topic to the classical network reliability analysis 87
with isolated (and uncorrelated) failures. 88
Many more disrupting failures, however, can be found 89
in the real world. These include the ones in which the 90
malfunctioning can propagate through the network, or 91
cover a large geographical area, thus affecting several 92
completely unrelated network elements simultaneously. 93
Root causes of such∧large-scale failures are typically natural 94disasters [24,25], but can also be virus/worms outbreaks 95
as well as intentional attacks [26]. Although the literature 96
on large-scale failures is vast in the context of the study 97
of complex networks (see for example [27–29] and the 98
references therein), far less research is published on the 99
modelling or the analysis of such failures in data networks. 100
Some well-published catastrophic failures are analysed 101
in [30,31] but they are not directly applicable to transport 102
networks, as they address the impact on the IP layer of the 103
global Internet. 104
Geographically correlated network failures affecting 105
specific locations are studied in [32,33]. They provide 106
models to evaluate reliability on given failure scenarios so 107
as to determine the most vulnerable areas of the physical 108
network. The focus is on the structural properties of given 109
topologies and their ability towithstand localised disasters 110
caused by non-propagating failures. 111
2.2. Failures in GMPLS-based networks 112
Usually, when GMPLS networks are considered (i.e. op- 113
tical networks), it is possible to distinguish two different 114
parts in every node (see Fig. 1). First of all there is a for- 115
warding componentwhere specifically designed hardware 116
is dedicated to processing, as quickly as possible, incoming 117
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Fig. 1. The control and data planes in the GMPLS architecture.
data packets to their corresponding output ports in accor-1
dancewith a forwarding table. Above this component there2
is a generic control hardware executing a specific network3
operating system that runs the routing and signalling pro-4
tocols and configures the forwarding table (when connec-5
tions are established or released). Although both compo-6
nents are usually located in the same device, they have7
some degree of isolation from one another. They can even8
be placed in different devices and have the control mes-9
sages sent through a different network [8].10
In such scenarios it would be possible for an attack11
or failure to only affect the control component or only12
the forwarding component, for a short or ∧midspan. It13 is even possible that, due to a virus, targeted attack or14
software configuration error, the failure only affects to a15
single control plane mechanism (i.e. signalling protocol or16
routing protocol). In the case that the signalling module17
fails and the routing module is still working, connections18
cannot be established or removed through that node. In19
this case it is possible to use the routing module to advise20
the neighbours that there is no free capacity available21
so they do not attempt to establish new connections22
through the partially failed node. On the other hand, if23
the signalling module is still operational but the routing24
module fails, changes in the local state (e.g. capacity25
being allocated/released) will not be advertised to the26
neighbours and they will be working with out-of-date27
information. However, the failed node could still be able to28
process new connection requests and tear down existing29
connections.30
In this work we assume that a control plane failure31
involves both signalling and routing failures. In this32
case, it is not possible to establish/release connections,33
and neighbours will work with out-of-date information34
whenever a control failure occurs. However, it is possible35
that, for some time, the forwarding component continues36
working properly with the forwarding table configured37
appropriately for the connections established before the38
failure. It would also be possible that, some time after the39
control plane failure, the data plane also fails thus causing40
a complete node failure and a disruption of the established41
connections through that node.42
It is of major importance to establish somemechanisms43
in order to recover the functionality of the failed control44
component as soon as possible and re-synchronise the45
control and forwarding components. This can be achieved46
by nodes implementing re-synchronisation mechanisms 47
like Non-Stop Forwarding and Graceful Restart [34,35]. 48
This is not easy to accomplish and may take some time 49
due to a first stage of reinstalling or rebooting the control 50
component and the necessary procedures and protocol 51
messages for that re-synchronisation [10]. 52
The issue of resilience of the control plane in GMPLS 53
networks is attracting some attention. In [36], time 54
related signalling parameters are studied to optimise fault 55
detection and control overhead in optical rings. The impact 56
of RSVP-TE and OSPF-TE message loss (i.e., messages for 57
signalling and routing) is studied in [37]. The analytical 58
model presented in [38] can be used to quantify the 59
number of links required in the control plane topology so 60
that the probability of losing a connection set-up or ∧tear 61down is below some value. 62
Unlike the above-referenced papers, in this work we 63
address the scenario in which failures can propagate, 64
through the GMPLS control plane from one node to its 65
neighbours, and once the control plane functionality is 66
affected, it is possible that the data plane is affected as well 67
thus creating the two-dimensional failure propagation 68
scenario discussed in the introduction.We focus on optical 69
ring networks for two reasons: First, they are widely 70
deployed as part of several transport technologies and are 71
commonly found in metropolitan area networks [15,39]. 72
Second, their structure lend itself amenable to the 73
study of the evolution of failures and the effects on 74
reliability through ∧continuous-time Markov chains, as will 75be discussed in the following sections. 76
2.3. Failure propagation based on epidemic models 77
Considering that the failures of interest in this paper 78
are those that propagate, epidemic models can be used 79
to characterise the dynamics of the spreading of failures. 80
The term ‘‘epidemic network’’ has been used to describe 81
and study how an epidemic evolves on a set of individuals 82
during a certain amount of time, both in contact networks 83
of biological individuals and in computer networks (see 84
for example [40,41] and the references therein). The 85
rise and decline of an epidemic may be probabilistically 86
characterised, and definitely depends upon the infection 87
propagation rate and the node connection degree [42]. 88
Research in this area involves the study of different aspects, 89
including how the epidemic evolves over time or how to 90
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immunise part of the population in order to minimise and1
control the epidemic propagation and its effects. Examples2
of networking applications where epidemic network3
models may apply include power supply networks, social4
networks, neural networks or computer networks.5
A large number of epidemicmodels have beenproposed6
to characterise the propagation of viruses in complex7
systems, mainly biological. A good review can be found8
in [43]. In this paper, we assume that failures propagate9
according to the SID model recently published by the10
authors in [44], and described in 2.2. Such studies11
presented a simulation-based study of the robustness of12
mesh topologies under the risk of SID based failures. This13
work completes [44] providing the analytical study of SID14
on ring topologies, and provides design rules for the repair15
rates required to achieve a given service availability goal.16
3. The SID (Susceptible-Infected-Disabled) model17
This section defines the states associated to each node,18
and the implications of being in each state from the func-19
tional point of view. Additionally, the assumptions made20
about failure spontaneous generation and propagation,21
necessary for developing the CTMC model in the next sec-22
tion, are also given.23
• The S state, stands for ‘‘susceptible state’’. In this state,24
both the control planes and the forwarding planes of25
the GMPLS node operate properly, hence the node is26
susceptible to becoming infected (i.e. suffering a failure)27
if at least one of its neighbours is already infected.28
Additionally, the node may fail spontaneously, which29
means that the node is creating a new infection.30
• The I state stands for ‘‘infected state’’. In this case,31
the GMPLS control plane is faulty, but the forwarding32
plane continues working properly. The node cannot33
participate in the establishment of new LSPs nor it is34
able to modify the current configuration of its LSPs.35
However, the traffic of already active LSPs may still be36
forwarded. A node in this state may propagate errors to37
its neighbours.38
• The D state stands for ‘‘disabled state’’. In this case,39
both the control and forwarding planes are faulty.40
Error propagations to adjacent cannot occur since node41
communication is disrupted.42
Fig. 2 shows the state-transition diagram for the SIDmodel,43
where the values on the arrows refer to the transition44
rates between states (the number of transition events that45
occur per unit of time). Essentially, Fig. 2 states that a46
node susceptible to being infected (a node that is working47
properly, i.e. on state S) becomes infected at rate β (if there48
exists at least one neighbouring node already infected). An49
infected node may become again operational (S state) or50
disabled (D state). The first case occurs at rate δ, which51
is the rate at which the network administrator fixes the52
problem, whereas the second case occurs at rate c . The53
network operator may also repair disabled nodes at rate t .54
Finally, βF refers to the spontaneous failure rate at which55
a given node in the network, whose neighbours are not56
infected, may actually become (spontaneously) infected.57
The rate value of βF is much smaller than β , so it does not58
Fig. 2. State-transition-rate diagram for the SID model.
Table 1
Summary of notation and parameters of the SID model.
Parameter Description
βF Spontaneous Infection rate
β Infection propagation rate
δ Control plane repairing rate
c Disabling rate
t Repairing rate of disabled nodes
appear in the calculation of the corresponding infection 59
rate for simplicity but also because we are considering 60
the following behavioural hypothesis: when one node 61
has just had a control plane failure (infection), no more 62
isolated nodes are allowed to have control plane failures 63
spontaneously, but rather only by infection propagation. 64
Table 1 summarises the parameters of the SID model. 65
It is important to remark that, in this scenario, the 66
epidemic spreading of failures happens only among 67
entities of the control plane, that is, the inter-plane failure 68
propagation (from the control plane to the data plane) is 69
not epidemic, rather it is the consequence of assuming that 70
a certain proportion of nodes in the ‘‘infected’’ state cannot 71
be repaired (returned to the ‘‘susceptible’’ state), at which 72
point the data plane (the whole node, in fact) also fails. 73
4. Analysis 74
4.1. Continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) model 75
In this work, failure events in an individual node are 76
assumed to occur independently from one another and to 77
exhibit the memoryless property, which means that inter- 78
failure times are exponentially distributed. This behaviour 79
is assumed for all possible events that may occur in the 80
scenario: control plane failures (infection propagation), 81
data plane failures (node disabled), control plane repairs 82
and complete node repairs (becoming operational from 83
the disabling state). Then, the use of a ∧continuous-time 84Markov chain to model the propagation of failures along 85
the GMPLS ring is very suitable. Basically, ∧continuous-time 86Markov chains (CTMC) are easily characterised by the so- 87
called∧state-transition-rate diagram (Fig. 2),which is a graph 88showing the system’s possible states, along with directed 89
arcs that represent the transition rates (in failure or repair 90
events per unit of time) between states. In this section, we 91
use a CTMCwhose states represent all the failure situations 92
that could possibly occur in a GMPLS ring of eight nodes. 93
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Additionally, the model’s transition rates between states1
are related to the failure propagation rates in the SIDmodel2
of Fig. 2.3
The ∧state-transition-rate diagram gives the infinitesi-4 mal generationmatrixQ , which characterises the transient5
behaviour of the CTMC. In this work, the matrix Q will be6
used to study the steady-state probabilities (that is, the7
percentage of time that the ring is in a given configuration8
in the long run) and the first-passage times of a given state9
(that is, the amount of time on average to reach a given10
state from some other).11
Essentially,withQ , the steady-state solution for a CTMC12
requires solving pi from the following set of equations:13
piQi =

j≠i
Qijpj, i ∈ C (1)14
where15 
j∈C
pj = 1 (2)16
and17
Qi = −

j≠i
Qij (3)18
where pi is the steady-state probability of state i, C is the19
state space and Qij is the transition rate from state i to state20
j, as specified in matrix Q . The values of pi give the amount21
of time that, in the long run, the CTMC stays on each state.22
Additionally, the Q matrix allows the computation of the23
expected transition time between any two nodes of the24
Markov chain. The ∧first-passage time from state i to state25 k (hereafter mik) is the mean time to reach state k for the26
first time given that the process started in state i, and is27
computed solving the following set of equations:28
mik = 1Qi +

j̸=k
Qij
Qi
mjk, i, j, k ∈ C (4)29
where Qi =j̸=i Qij.30
4.2. An eight-node ring study case31
Fig. 3 shows an eight-node GMPLS ring network to be32
modelled by a CTMC. The CTMC model is based on the33
following assumptions:34
(1) Already infected nodes may infect only neighbouring35
nodes. Basically, a node may be infected only if it has36
at least one neighbouring node already infected. The37
first infection occurs spontaneously (βF ).38
(2) Already infected nodesmay become disabled. Disabled39
nodes cannot infect other nodes, nor can they propa-40
gate their disabling state to other nodes.41
(3) Both infected and disabled nodes may be repaired42
by the administrator, but only if they are adjacent43
to a susceptible node. In other words, node repair44
strategies occur at the edges of the infected/disabled45
area.46
In light of this, Fig. 4 shows the complete ∧state-transition-47 rate diagram of a CTMCmodel for the ring topology shown
Fig. 3. The eight-node GMPLS-based ring example.
in Fig. 3. Each state is labelledwith the triple (NIl : ND : NIr), 48
where ND refers to the number of disabled nodes (nodes 49
in state D), and the NIl and NIr side denotes the number 50
of infected nodes (nodes in state I) on the two sides of 51
the disabled node. When ND = 0 (that is, no nodes are 52
in state D), then the state notation may be reduced to 53
(0 : 0 : NIr). For instance, state (0 : 1 : 1) denotes the case 54
of one disabled and one infected node next to the disabled 55
one, regardless of their absolute position in the ring (by 56
convention NIl ≤ NIr ). 57
As an example, consider the ring of Fig. 3. Initially, the 58
ring is in state (0 : 0 : 0) as there is no node in either 59
the infected or disabled state. This is illustrated in Fig. 5(a). 60
At some point in time, one node becomes spontaneously 61
infected as depicted in Fig. 5(b). This occurs at rate 8βF and 62
brings the ring to the state (0 : 0 : 1). From there on, the 63
infected node may cause the transition to: 64
• the state (0 : 1 : 0) if it becomes disabled which occurs 65
at rate c. This case is illustrated in Fig. 5(c). 66
• the state (0 : 0 : 2) if the infection is passed on to a 67
neighbour. This occurs at rate 2β (See Fig. 5(d)) because 68
the infected nodemay infect either of two neighbouring 69
nodes. 70
• the state (0 : 0 : 0) (Fig. 5(a)), if the network operator 71
repairs the node and returns it to the susceptible state. 72
The rate of this transition is δ, which is the repairing 73
rate. 74
Taking a closer look at the state (0 : 0 : 2), we can see that 75
the possible transitions from there on are: 76
• to the state (0 : 0 : 3)when an additional adjacent node 77
becomes infected (see Fig. 5(e)), which again occurs at 78
rate 2β . 79
• to the state (0 : 1 : 1) if one of the two infected nodes 80
become disabled, which occurs at rate 2c (see Fig. 5(f)). 81
• to the state (0 : 0 : 1) if one of the two infected nodes 82
is repaired. This occurs at rate 2δ (see Fig. 5(b)). 83
In contrast, from state (0 : 1 : 0), no new infections de- 84
velop because disabled nodes do not propagate infec- 85
tion. Therefore, the only possible transition is to the state 86
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Fig. 4. State-transition-rate diagram for the SID model of an ∧eight-node GMPLS ring.
(0 : 0 : 0)when repairing actions are taken by the network1
operator.2
The remaining states and transition rates can be easily3
computed, thus yielding Fig. 4. In the figure, there is a4
special state denoted as ‘‘DISC’’. This state comprises a set5
ofmany states: All stateswithmore thanonedisablednode6
(that is, x : D : y for D > 1 and any values of x and y)7
and all states with no susceptible nodes (that is 0 : 0 : 88
and 0 : 1 : 7). Such a ‘‘Disconnection’’ state represents the9
case where the network operator must take urgent repair10
action.We consider that the network operator is capable of11
restoring a disconnected network at rate tR. The value of tR12
is considered to bemuch smaller than t in order to take into13
account that ‘‘Disconnected’’ networks are much harder to14
repair. Finally, the goal of this study is to design the repair15
rates δ and t to have the ring in the ‘‘Disconnection’’ state16
less than 99.999% of the time.17
Table 2 shows the infinitesimal generationmatrixQ8 for18
this particular CTMC, as obtained from the state-transition-19
rate diagram of Fig. 4. The empty gaps are zeros, excepting20
the diagonal values:21
Qii =

j≠i
Qij.22
4.3. A general model for GMPLS rings with N nodes23
From the case with eight nodes, it is easy to infer the24
following rules in constructing the infinitesimal generation25
matrix QN as it is shown in Table 2, for a ringwith a general26
number of nodesN . These rules are summarised in Table 3.27
5. Numerical results28
5.1. Performance metrics29
Next, we study the steady-state probability of a number30
of key sets of states in the CTMC, which represent different31
types of network malfunctioning (see Fig. 6). Such key32
states are:33
• Fully Operational, (0 : 0 : 0) state: This is the state 34
at which all nodes in the ring work properly, but are 35
susceptible to spontaneous infection. It is characterised 36
by P(0:0:0), that is, the percentage of time at which the 37
ring has all its nodes fully functional. 38
• Moderate Infection, (0 : {0, 1} :< NI,max) state: This 39
set contains all the states of the ring where the number 40
of infected nodes is smaller than some value NI,max, 41
and the number of disabled nodes is either 0 or 1. 42
This case is characterised by Plow,I which is the sum of 43
the steady-state probabilities of all states meeting such 44
a condition. This group of states refer to a moderate 45
infection propagation along the ring and should be 46
considered by the administrator as a potential case of 47
severe network infection. 48
• Severe Infection, (0 : {0, 1} :> NI,max) state: This set 49
contains all the states of the ring where the number 50
of infected nodes exceeds some value NI,max, and the 51
number of disabled nodes is either 0 or 1. This case 52
is characterised by Phigh,I , the sum of the steady-state 53
probabilities meeting such a condition. This group of 54
states refers to a severe infection propagation along the 55
ring and should be considered by the network operator 56
as the previous stage towards network disconnection. 57
• Disconnection, (DISC) state: this is the state in which 58
the ring has more than one disabled node, or all its 59
nodes are infected. In such a case, there are at least two 60
nodes that cannot communicatewith each other, which 61
is unacceptable to most network operators. This case is 62
characterised by PDISC , that is, the percentage of time at 63
which the ring has two or more disable nodes, or all the 64
ring nodes are infected. 65
The value of Nl,max may be chosen between 0 and N . In 66
the numerical examples we use Nl,max = N/2, that is, 67
we consider that the severe infection state begins when at 68
least 50% of nodes in the ring have some kind of failure. 69
Such groups of states are shown in Fig. 6. The 70
‘‘Fully Operational’’ state is marked using a pentagonal 71
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(a) 0:0:0. (b) 0:0:1.
(c) 0:1:0. (d) 0:0:2.
(e) 0:0:3. (f) 0:1:1.
Fig. 5. Different ring states: (a) (0:0:0), (b) (0:0:1), (c) (0:1:0), (d) (0:0:2), (e) (0:0:3) and (f) (0:1:1).
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Table 2
Infinitesimal generation matrix for an eight-node GMPLS ring (Q8).
Table 3
Transition generation rules for QN .
Ring state
From To Qij Condition
(0 : 0 : 0) (0 : 0 : 1) NβF
(0 : 0 : 1) (0:1:1) 0
(0 : 1 : x) (0 : 1 : x+ 1) β x > 0
(y : 1 : x) (y : 1 : x+ 1) β x ≥ y, y ≥ 0
(y : 1 : x) (y+ 1 : 1 : x) β x ≥ y, y ≥ 0
(0 : 0 : x) (0 : 0 : x+ 1) 2β x ≥ 1
(x : 1 : x) (x : 1 : x+ 1) 2β x ≥ 0
(0 : 0 : N − 1) DISC 2β
(0 : 0 : x) (0 : 1 : 0) c x ≥ 1
(0 : 0 : x) ( x−12 : 1 : x−12 ) c x odd and x ≥ 2
(0 : 0 : x) (0 : 1 : x− 1) 2c x ≥ 1
(0 : 0 : x) (y : 1 : x− y− 1) 2c y = 1, 2, 3, . . . while y ≤ x
(y : 0 : x) DISC (x+ y)c
(0 : 1 : N − 2) DISC (N − 2)c + β
(y : 1 : N − y− 2) DISC (N − 2)c + 2β
(0 : 1 : x) (0 : 0 : x) t
(0 : 0 : 1) (0 : 0 : 0) 2δ
(x : 1 : x) (x− 1 : 1 : x) 2δ x ≥ 1
(0 : 0 : x) (0 : 0 : x− 1) δ x ≥ 2
(y : 1 : x) (y : 1 : x− 1) δ x > y
(y : 1 : x) (y− 1 : 1 : x) δ x > y > 0
shape. States belonging to the ‘‘Moderate Infection’’1
group use square-shaped boxes while ‘‘Severe Infection’’2
ones are surrounding by an elliptical shape. Finally the3
‘‘Disconnection’’ is clearly marked with a rounded-corner4
rectangle.5
Additionally, it is of interest to study the average ∧first-6 passage times to any of the threemalfunctioning groups of7
states to see how often these situations arise from a fully8
functional state (0 : 0 : 0).9
The following numerical examples study these perfor- 10
mance metrics in detail. 11
5.2. Steady-state probability results 12
After solving the steady-state probabilities of the CTMC- 13
based model, it is easy to show the percentage of time 14
that the ring stays in every set of states as a function of 15
the two repairing rates: the rate δ, at which the control 16
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DISC
Operational
Moderate infection
Disconnection
Severe infection
Fig. 6. Groups of states under study.
Fig. 7. Impact of t on the steady-state probabilities of the CTMC for the eight-node GMPLS ring.
plane of a node is repaired (this is, transition rate from1
the Infected state to the Susceptible state of a node) and2
the rate t at which nodes are fully repaired (transition3
rate from the Disabled state to the Susceptible state). The4
units of all the rates are normalised as the amount of5
transitions events (failures or reparations) that occur in an6
infinitesimal period of time in the CTMC model.7
Numerical results are plotted for different values of δ,β ,8
t and c. The figures use the following notation: Subindex9
‘‘000’’ is used for the Fully ∧Operational state, subindex10 ‘‘HighI’’ represents the Severe Infection case, ‘‘LowI’’ is11
used for Moderate Infection results and finally ‘‘DISC’’ here 12
refers to the Disconnection state results. 13
Fig. 7 shows the steady-state probabilities of the CTMC 14
for the eight-node GMPLS ring for different values of δ, β , c 15
and t . The control and data plane repair rate value is fixed 16
at c = 1 repair per unit of time (e.g. hour) for all four plots. 17
The two upper plots consider δ = 5 (control plane repair 18
rate) while the two lower plots consider δ = 100. The two 19
plots on the left consider a fixed value of β = 1 (infection 20
rate), while the two plots on the right consider a fixed β = 21
20 value. Several conclusions arise from this figure: First, 22
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Fig. 8. Impact of δ on the steady-state probabilities of the CTMC for the eight-node GMPLS ring.
the four scenarios show an almost constant steady-state1
probability, regardless of the value of t (almost horizontal2
lines). Second, the upper-left and lower-right figures have3
the same β/δ = 1/5 ratio and show very similar steady-4
state probabilities. Only the bottom-left plot of Fig. 7 shows5
a reasonably low PDISC value, which has a β/δ = 1/1006
low value. Essentially, the ratio β/δ is the key in having a7
sufficiently low value of PDISC as shown in Fig. 8.8
Fig. 8 considers the value of t = 0.5 (top plots)9
and t = 50 (bottom plots) for different infection rates10
β = 1 (left plots) and β = 20 (right plots). The plots11
show similar behaviour with decreasing disconnection12
probability PDISC for large values of δ for different values of13
β . Essentially, in order to achieve a disconnection steady-14
state probability below 10−5, δ > 4× 102β∧when β = 1 is15 required (Fig. 8 top- and bottom-right) and δ > 4 × 103β16
when β = 20 (Fig. 8 top- and bottom-left). Hence, it is safe17
to have a repairing rate δ about three orders of magnitude18
larger than the infection rate β , i.e. δ > 103β to guarantee19
99.999% network availability.20
5.3. First-passage times: MTTF and MTTR21
This section studies the first-passage times of the22
three malfunctioning groups of states: Moderate infection,23
Severe infection andDisconnection, starting from state (0 :24
0 : 0). This is referred to asMean Time To Failure (MTTF) as25
it gives the average time to reach each state starting from26
the fully operational state (0 : 0 : 0), as computed from27
Eq. (4).28
As shown in Fig. 9, the behaviour is again independent29
of t (upper and lower figures look the same). Again, the30
message is that, in order to have a failure after 105 units31
of time, the value of δmust be large enough in comparison32
with β , that is of about three orders of magnitude larger.33
Finally the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) analysis is 34
shown in Fig. 10. This figure gives the average time 35
required to get to state (0 : 0 : 0) from any of the 36
malfunctioning groups of states. In order to achieve very 37
low MTTR values (in the order of 10−2 units of time), the 38
values of δ are required to be several orders of magnitude 39
larger than β . 40
5.4. A GMPLS ring with 32 nodes 41
This section shows numerical results for a large-size 42
ring of 32 nodes. Using the rules inferred in Section 4.3, the 43
infinitesimal generationmatrixQ32 is calculated and hence 44
the steady-state probabilities for the CTMC model are 45
resolved for the 32-node ring. Fig. 11 shows the ratio δ/β 46
(y-axis) required to achieve a certain service unavailability 47
(x-axis), assuming different combinations of β and t . As 48
shown, for a desired service unavailability of 10−5 the 49
value of δ must be between 102 and 103 times the value of 50
β . This conclusion was also obtained from the analysis of 51
the eight-node ring of the previous section. This provides 52
a rule for network operators in the design of their δ value 53
strategy. 54
6. Summary and conclusions 55
This work has presented a CTMC model to characterise 56
the transient behaviour and possible states of GMPLS- 57
based networks with ring topology whose nodes may 58
become infected or disabled following the SID failure 59
propagation model. A full set of numerical examples has 60
been presented, focused on analysing the resulting steady- 61
state probabilities alongwith theMean Time To Failure and 62
Mean Time To Repair values for a selected number of δ 63
and t repair rates on two GMPLS rings of 8 and 32 nodes, 64
respectively. 65
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Fig. 9. Mean time to failure (MTTF) results.
Fig. 10. Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) results.
The presented CTMCmodel can help network operators1
in finding the required repair rates of control and data2
planes δ and t tomaintain a certain level of availability, say3
99.999%. Additionally, the model can be used for studying4
the sensitivity of the network to different combinations of5
failure and repair rates, in terms of the expected number of6
nodes in each state of the SID model (Susceptible, Infected7
or Disabled).8
As it is concluded from the numerical examples9
conducted with rings of different sizes, a good design10
rule is to have the repair rate of infected nodes δ much11
larger (about three orders ofmagnitude) than the infection12
rate β . Basically, when δ is so large with respect to β13
we have infected nodes which are repaired very quickly, 14
minimising the probability of infecting others. 15
This is clearly seen from the next example: When the 16
CTMC moves from state (0 : 0 : 0) to state (0 : 0 : 1), 17
then the next movement is either to (0 : 0 : 2), (0 : 1 : 0) 18
or back (0 : 0 : 0), with rates 2β , c and δ respectively. By 19
keeping δ ≫ (2β + c), the network operator ensures that 20
the infection propagates to neighbouring nodes with very 21
little probability, only: 22
2β
2β + δ + c . 23
Hence, the network operator must ensure that δ ≫ β 24
in order to avoid infection propagation. 25
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PD SC
δ/
β
Fig. 11. Impact of δ/β in the ∧steady-state probabilities of the CTMC forthe 32-node GMPLS ring.
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